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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to review past trade relations in the grains sector between the
United States and Canada and to document trade barriers and the potential for the evolution of
reciprocal trade.  Historical trade flows between the United States and Canada in the grains sector
are reviewed.  Terms of recent trade agreements and other trade restrictions are described.  Then,
some of the important differences in the marketing system are described and compared as well as
changes in the Canadian grain marketing system.  Finally, the concept of reciprocal access is
developed in the context of the evolving trading relations between these two countries.  
Key Words:  grain trade, U.S.-Canada trade, trade policy  1 All tables and figures are contained in the appendix. 
2 This is likely due to important differences in malting barley varieties (Wilson and Johnson 1995a) which
may have constrained the potential for increased flows from Canada to the United States.  
Reciprocal Access in U.S./Canadian Grain Trade
Background Issues for the U.S. Grain Trade
1. Introduction and Purpose 
In the period spanned by the CUSTA and NAFTA agreements, grain trade between
Canada and the United States has increased.  The prevailing trade has been from Canada to the
United States in raw grains in part due to U.S. farm programs, supply/demand factors, and
marketing problems and constraints within Canada.  There has been less trade from the United
States to or through Canada, though it has occurred.  During this period, there have also been
important structural changes in the marketing systems, particularly in Canada, ultimately
increasing pressures to integrate at least certain aspects of these marketing systems.  
The Canada/U.S. Joint Commission on Grains recognized the importance of reciprocal
access between these countries’ marketing systems to mitigate some of the problems that have
emerged.  This paper develops the importance and context of reciprocal access in grain trading. 
Section 2 provides some background data on trade and trade barriers.  Section 3 reviews previous
studies.  Section 4 identifies important differences in the marketing systems, and Section 5
concludes with a focus on principal issues in the future.
2. Status of Bi-Lateral Trade 
2.1 Trade Volume 1990-current 
Grain Commodities: Trade in wheat, barley, and oats between the United States and
Canada largely flowed from Canada to the United States from 1990 to 1996 (Canada Grains
Council).
1  Canadian exports of wheat to the United States increased from 290 tmt in 1990 to
2,172 tmt in 1993.  Since 1993, wheat exports have declined to near 564 tmt in 1995 and were up
to 955 tmt in the first 10 months of 1996.  In contrast, U.S. exports of wheat to Canada have been
less than 35 tmt per year, but were 62 tmt in the first 10 months of 1996.  Durum exports to the
United States behave similarly, increasing from 370 tmt in 1990 to a high of 466 tmt in 1993 and
declining to 182 tmt in 1995.  Exports of Canadian barley to the United States follow a similar
pattern, increasing from 389 tmt in 1990 to 1791 tmt in 1993 and then declining to 782 tmt in
1995.  Although exports of malting barley were higher in 1993 than in 1990, most of the large
volume of barley exports to the United States in 1993 were due to exports of feed barley.
2  U.S.
exports of barley to Canada have been limited, but increased to 8.9 tmt in 1995.   Canadian
exports of oats have steadily increased from 171 tmt in 1990 to 1400 tmt in 1995, while U.S.
exports of oats have been less than 3.1 tmt.3 In addition to these grains and semi-processed products, the volume of trade in further processed and
consumer products has escalated.  See Krause, Dooley, and Wilson for a summary of that trade.
4 NAFTA tariff rates for market access to Canada for specified commodities in 1996 are listed in
Appendix Table 1.
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Exports of wheat, barley, oats, and products largely flowed from Canada to the United
States from 1990-1996, reaching a peak in 1993 (Figures 1-5). 
Semi-Processed Grain Commodities:
3  Wheat flour exports from Canada to the United
States have similarly increased from 19 tmt in 1990 to 164 tmt in 1995 (Figures 1, 6).  Much of
this has been in spring wheat flour.  Canadian exports of malt to the United States declined from
20 tmt in 1990 to 7.1 tmt in 1992.  Since then, Canadian malt exports increased to 32 tmt in 1995.
U.S. exports of malt to Canada were limited up to 1993, but increased to 11.8 tmt in 1995 (Figure
7). Canadian exports of wheat gluten to the United States declined from 9,619 mt in 1991 to
3,176 mt in 1995.  Imports of gluten from the United States have ranged from a high of 1,000 mt
in 1992 to a low of 109 mt in 1995 (Figure 8).  Canadian and U.S. export trade of starch for food
use has fluctuated with one country’s exporting more than the other in different years.  Canada
has dominated export trade of starch for industrial use.  U.S. exports of industrial use starch have
been less than 555 mt, while Canadian exports have ranged from a high of 19,234 mt in 1993 to a
low of 9,255 mt in 1995 (Figures 9-10).
2.2 Tariffs and Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) Under CUSTA and NAFTA
Under the CUSTA, annual support levels for wheat, barley, and oats were measured for
the United States and Canada to govern trade restrictions.  Under the agreement, when U.S.
support levels were less than Canadian support levels (based on a moving average), Canadian
import licenses would be removed.  This occurred for oats in 1990 and wheat in 1991, and
Canadian import licenses were removed for these commodities.  However, primarily due to high
EEP subsidies for U.S. barley, import licenses remained for exports of barley to Canada.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  replaced the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement (CUSTA) by incorporating the phase-out schedules contained in CUSTA. 
Additional provisions in the NAFTA agreement included 1) Canada increased global import
quotas for chicken, turkey, and shell eggs, while 2) the United States maintained the right to
restrict imports to protect its price support programs for grains.  Under Section 22, the United
States applied TRQs on wheat during September 1994-1995.  These provisions resulted in a
series of disputes and negotiations restricting imports of Canadian wheat, primarily durum
(Gardner, 1997).  Under NAFTA, all tariffs (with few exceptions) were to be phased out by
January 1, 1998.
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On July 31, 1995,  Canada eliminated its import licensing requirements for wheat, barley,
and their products on an MFN basis.  The next day, Canada implemented TRQs (Tariff rate5 TRQ access commitments for U.S. exports to Canada for 1995/1996 and 2000/2001 are shown in
Appendix Table 2.
3
quota) for these products.  These are the WTO commitments.  Under the WTO/Uruguay Round,
non-tariff barriers were converted to tariffs.  Many import quotas were converted to TRQs which
provided for within-quota quantity and generally high over-quota tariffs.  Under GATT
requirements, TRQ access commitments are to be increased, within-quota tariff rates are subject
to reduction, and over-quota tariff rates are to be lowered over 6 years.
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In 1996, Canada applied the NAFTA tariff rates on wheat imported from the United
States, but counted U.S. wheat imports toward WTO access commitments (Appendix Table 1). 
For barley and malt, Canada did not apply the NAFTA tariff rates (Appendix Table 2), but instead
applied the higher WTO over quota tariff rates (Appendix Table 3).  Canada argued that licensing
requirements established before the WTO agreement allowed it to apply these over quota tariff
rates and TRQs and that this was consistent with  NAFTA.  The United States filed a complaint
under NAFTA for these WTO tariffs for dairy, poultry, and barley products as applied to imports
from the United States. 
The United States lost this challenge.  Canada won a unanimous decision by all panel
members, indicating that Canada has the right to apply the tariffs that were agreed to in the WTO
agreements on imports of U.S. dairy, poultry, egg, margarine, and barley products and that these
tariffs are consistent with the provisions of NAFTA.  Under NAFTA, Canada was allowed to
maintain quantitative import restrictions against certain U.S. imports.  However, under the WTO,
Canada is obliged to end its quantitative import restrictions and has the right to convert them into
tariff equivalents (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade).  
The under-access tariff for barley and barley products was set to be eliminated in January
1998, and actual imports of barley have not reached the under-access limit.  This suggests that
other factors are limiting the movement of barley into Canada. 
Tariff rate quotas on barley and barley products were a major item at trade talks between
U.S. and Canadian negotiators.  Following these talks in Ottawa in September 1997, the Canadian
government indicated it would suspend application of tariff rate quotas on U.S. barley and barley
products (Elliot).
2.3 Other Trade Restrictions
End-use Certificates:  Under implementing legislation for NAFTA, the USDA was
required to implement an end-use certificate system to monitor imports of all wheat or barley
from all countries with similar requirements as of April 8, 1994.  Canada was the only country
imposing end-use certificates on U.S. wheat and, as such, is the only country affected by the
regulations.  End-use certificates were implemented on February 27, 1995, for all wheat entering6 These end-use certificates inhibit resale of the grain, thus reducing the flexibility of Canadian end users.
7 This debate continues.  U.S.-Canada discussions in Ottawa focused on end-use certificates with further
talks scheduled (Elliot).
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the United States from Canada.  Since Canada does not require end-use certificates on barley,
end-use certificates were established for wheat only.
Final rules for end-use certificates require U.S. importers to store Canadian-produced
wheat separately from other stocks to preserve its identity until it is delivered for export, or to the
exporter, or end user.  Importers can commingle Canadian and U.S. wheat when it is being loaded
for delivery to the end user.  However, exports of Canadian grain cannot be shipped under U.S.
export subsidy and other export programs (including EEP, GSM, and PL480).  End-use
certificates were established to restrict the use of Canadian grain in U.S. export subsidy programs,
but do not prohibit the commingling of Canadian wheat for use in domestic food aid programs. 
Importers are required to submit end-use certificates to the Farm Service Agency (FSA) within 15
work days of the grain’s entering the United States.  All sales and resales of Canadian-produced
wheat are required to be reported within 15 days of the sale.  Exporters and end users are also
required to submit quarterly reports on consumption amounts and methods (USDA-ERS, Wheat
Situation Yearbook, 1995; NGTC, Issue Update, 1995). 
Canada also has import requirements for U.S. wheat.  Imports for human consumption
must have an end-use certificate and remain segregated from Canadian wheat.
6  Imports of U.S.
wheat for feed must have a certain percentage that are colored and must be denatured.  An import
permit is required under the Plant Protection Act at no fee, and a phytosanitary certificate must be
obtained from the Canadian Grain Commission.  Further, if delivery of U.S. wheat imports is to a
licensed Canadian elevator, the elevator operator must have received prior authorization from the
Canadian Grain Commission.  CGC authorization will be given only if it is satisfied that elevator
capacity and procedures would ensure that Canadian and U.S. grains would not be commingled
(Agriculture Canada).  The Canadian government has indicated that these requirements are
needed to maintain the integrity of the Canadian grain handling system.
Debate has focused on removing end-use certificates in both Canada and the United
States.
7  The Joint Commission on Grains proposed this change.  The National Grain Trade
Council indicated that end-use certificates will put increased demands on the domestic market and
infrastructure.  Significant reporting requirements are required along with the requirement to
preserve identity of the grain.
Phytosanitary and environment issues (Karnel Bunt, Flagsmut, Dwarf Bunt, and TCK
Requirements):  Canada established restrictions for karnal bunt on imports of U.S. grains on
March 26, 1996.  Under this policy, durum wheat from the continental United States and barley,
oats, sorghum, and millet from Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas are prohibited from
entering Canada.  Wheat other than durum and other grains not infested with karnal bunt and flag8 This was completed in Spring 1997.
9 Dahl and Wilson provide an extensive review of these provisions and differences.
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smut and from an approved elevator on the U.S. approved elevator list can enter Canada, but
must be certified as karnal bunt free (Alberta Agriculture, May 12, 1996).  Proof of where the
seed was grown must be provided.
Variety Control:  Imports of grain for seed into Canada are controlled by the Canada
Seeds Act.  Regulations to import grains for seed use are very extensive.  Seed varieties must
undergo a rigorous variety approval process to be sold in Canada.  Varieties must meet
requirements for agronomic, disease resistance, visual distinguishability, and end-use quality
parameters.  If varieties fail in any of these areas, they can be rejected.  In the Canadian marketing
system, varieties within a class must be visually distinguishable from other classes.  Specifically,  
The criteria for variety approval comprise scientific as well as non-scientific factors.  This
system of variety control is considered a key element of the Canadian grain quality system. 
The Canada Seeds Act regulations are currently under review; Agriculture Canada
officials hope to finish a regulatory overhaul in Spring 1996, USDA-FAS, p. 43.
8
This requirement has been argued to reduce the number of varieties released and has been
identified as one of the requirements that could potentially be changed.
9  
3. Inquiries/Studies
Reciprocal trade issues between the United States and Canada have been studied.  Of
particular note is the Canada/U.S. Joint Commission on Grains study.  The  Joint Commission
examined all aspects of the two countries’ marketing support systems for all grains and the effect
of those systems on the Canadian and U.S. markets and on competition between the two
countries in third country markets.  The Joint Commission identified a number of conditions
affecting cross-border trade in grains:  1) differences in domestic programs and support levels, 2)
strain on U.S. northern tier infrastructure by increased Canadian imports, 3) increased Canadian
shipments lowered local U.S. prices, 4)  weather effects on trade flows, and 5) limited access to
Canadian markets by U.S. producers and shippers.  
In addition, agreements, while reducing barriers to trade still have limitations:  1) the
general nature of agreements make it difficult to deal with local and specific commodity trade
issues; 2) complex, costly, and time-consuming nature of dispute resolution makes it difficult for
producers to access these provisions; 3) full commercial arbitrage is limited unless full reciprocal
access to each country’s domestic markets, grain handling, and transportation facilities is
achieved; and 4) trade agreements do not necessarily include provisions to anticipate and respond
to emerging trade issues (Canada-United States Joint Commission on Grains, p. 65). 6
After extensive deliberations, the Joint Commission made some important
recommendations to facilitate the changing competitive and trade environment for grain trade
between these countries:  1) policy coordination between the United States and Canada to reduce
the trade-distorting effects of policies, 2) establishment of a bilateral producer/industry based
consultative committee to anticipate and provide appropriate and timely recommendations to
industry and/or governments for preventive actions to address short-term cross-border issues, 3)
grain inspection services in both countries to standardize measurements between countries, 4)
Canada to examine the non-registered varieties, 5) both countries to eliminate end-use certificates,
6) Canada to deregulate its rail transportation system, 7) both countries to monitor the use of the
river system with respect grain movements and agree to seek solutions if problems become
apparent, 8) both countries to eliminate export subsidies and excessive discriminatory pricing
practice, and 9) that Canada not apply WTO tariff rate quotas on barley (Canada-United States
Joint Commission on Grains).
The Joint Commission also indicated that a longer-term objective is to provide reciprocal
access over time (p. 95).  Issues surrounding the idea of reciprocal access were identified in a
number of the research papers prepared for the commission.  Though the concept was not
completely defined, several authors discussed it.  Gray and Gardner identified many of the
domestic farm programs affecting reciprocal trade.  Furtan and Abel identified transparency and
differential pricing aspects affecting reciprocal trade.  Wilson, Johnson, and Dahl and Loyns and
Kraut  indicated factors affecting spatial arbitrage.  The main body of the report prepared by the
commission focused on reciprocal trade.  It was pointed out that Canada has less impeded access
to the U.S. system than do U.S. firms to the Canadian market.  Areas identified of importance for
reciprocal access include increasing environmental regulations, differences in grading systems
between the two countries, and the impact of Canadian varietal control regulations on reciprocal
access. 
During the Joint Commission’s discussions, numerous issues were identified about 
problems in the Canadian marketing system.  However, the prevailing view was that these were
Canadian problems and should be addressed in Canada, as opposed to the Joint Commission. 
Thus, subsequently and/or in response, Canada initiated its own internal inquiry to identify
important changes for the future, particularly given changes within the North American marketing
system.  The Western Grains Marketing Panel’s (WGMP) report examined all aspects of the
marketing of western Canadian grains, oilseeds, and specialty crops.  The objective of this review
was to provide a basis for Canada’s future marketing system to be dynamic, efficient, effective,
and responsive to best serve the needs of farmers, customers, and other stakeholders.  Many of
the recommendations by the WGMP would have been responsive to issues surrounding reciprocal
access.  
One aspect examined was the potential for shipping Canadian grain via the U.S.
transportation system.  Young reports that a study by the Transport Institute found that in specific
situations, transhipment of Canadian grains would be feasible.  Primary routes were shipment of
grain by barge to the gulf, by rail to the gulf, and, in special cases, from the western prairies10 Since then, there have been  shipments of unit trains direct from Winnipeg to the U.S. PNW ports from
export.
7
through Montana to the Pacific Northwest.  This last route was most feasible when deliveries
were made directly to U.S. elevators (Young).
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Concurrent and as input into the WGMP, Kraft et al. analysed actual transaction prices for
exported Canadian wheat.  Results were important since their analysis indicated that on average,
the CWB captured premiums of $13/mt from 1980 to 1994.  In addition, this study identified
several virtues of the Canadian system that warranted the premiums:  quality (notably cleanliness
and consistency), market development, and technical assistance.  The Exchange Group
interviewed importers to identify the relative performance of the CWB versus marketing systems
of other exporting countries.  
The WGMP made 33 recommendations for changes in the Canadian marketing system. 
Those of particular importance for trade within North America include 1) restructure the
governance of the CWB, 2) allow the CWB to make cash purchases, 3) allow for an option of
spot and forward cash prices made available to farmers by the CWB for a portion of their sales of
licensed wheats excluding durum, 4) restrict the total amount of wheat available for pricing
outside the pool to not less than 25% of total farmer deliveries, 5) change to an open marketing
system for feed barley, 6) maintain malting barley sales only through the CWB, 7) develop a
controlled Identity Preserved (IP) system that would allow unlicensed varieties (U.S.) in an IP
system operated by the CGC, 8) institute more rigorous government controls on strikes and
lockouts in the grain handling and transportation system, and 9) resolve the problem of vessel
delays at the Port of Vancouver by having Transport Canada take a lead role on an urgent basis. 
However, the Canadian government has not incorporated the major recommendations into
legislation, but has proposed letting the new governance of the CWB act on these
recommendations when needed. 
Several studies (including Johnson and Wilson and Young), have addressed some of these
issues, but in a broader context of policy differences.  Wilson and Johnson (1995b) analyzed the
impacts of critical U.S. policies on North American trade in the barley sector.  Of interest to this
study was that both the EEP and CRP induced imports from Canada and that changes in the
WGTA rail rates would also have increased exports from Canada to the United States.  
Young examined the impacts of changes in Canadian grain policies and implications for
Montana’s grain industry.  She found that changes in Canada’s rail system will increase shipping
rates in Canada substantially, increasing the incentive to export Canadian grain either through or
to the United States.  Specific comparisons of the shipping rates indicated that shipment of
Canadian grain to the Pacific Northwest is not competitive.  However, shipment either by rail or
rail/barge from Rosetown to the U.S. gulf was cost competitive with both rail and rail/Laker
shipments from Rosetown to Quebec City.  Young reviewed other studies (Producer Payment
Panel and Johnson and Wilson) and examined effects of Canadian wheat imports on Montana11 Fulton and Gray indicated that these differences are as much as $1/bushel.
12 This system is under dispute in Canada and is under pressure for change.  For an extensive review of
the evolution of car allocation in the United States, see Priewe and Wilson.    
13 This is notwithstanding the potential implications of various forms of government-owned cars in
Canada.
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prices for wheat.  She indicated that even though other studies did find that changes in grain
policies would increase wheat imports, the estimated price effects of wheat imports in Montana
and the United States ranged from less than 1 to 2 cents/bushel by Alston, Gray, and Sumner, and
Marsh and Johnson.  
Even though changes in Canadian grain policies would increase incentives to export grain
either to or through the United States, the amount of exports to the United States is largely under
control of the Canadian Wheat Board.  The CWB markets all board grains (wheat and barley).  As
such, wheat not sold to the United States through the CWB must be bought back either by the
farmer or grain elevator to be sold into the United States.  The CWB controls the amount of
exports through this process as it sets the buyback price.  In practice, most of the wheat bought
back for resale to the United States has been done by the grain elevators.  Young also suggested
that the CWB restricts exports to the United States to avoid retaliation.
4. Marketing System Differences and Changes Toward Integration
Future cross-border trade prospects will be affected in part by the trade policy
environment, but also by differences and commercial changes in the marketing system.  There are
several important fundamental differences among these marketing systems.  In addition, some
important changes are occurring.   
Canadian Rail Shipping Regulations:   There are important differences between the rail
shipping systems in the two countries that could affect future trade flows.  One is that though
Canadian rail rates have been increased, they are still less than those that apply from similar U.S.
shipping points.  These differences are particularly notable in the Northern tier regions of North
Dakota and Montana.
11  If everything else is the same with equal access, this difference is
important because it should induce some U.S. grain to move to or through the Canadian
marketing system. Through this process, the potential for cross-border trade would provide
competition to shipping regimes for U.S. grains.  Canadian shippers are not treated differently
when using the U.S. transportation system and generally have equal access to its capacity at non-
discriminatory rates.  This would not be true for U.S. shipments through Canada.  
Canadian Railcar Allocation:   Railcar allocation in Canada is highly administered based
on past shipping practices.  One important distinction is between the allocation of cars for
shipment of CWB grains versus non-board commodities.
12,13  CWB cars are allocated by the
railroads for movements of CWB  grains, and those cars are allocated by the CWB to its14 This is likely one of the goals of the CTA dispute about Canadian grain shipments.
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designated shippers and train runs (zones have been proposed) for the movements of CWB grains. 
The other portion is allocated by the CAPG (Car Allocation Policy Group, a temporary
mechanism to replace a previous regime called the Grain Transportation Authority) as non-board
allocator, for the movement of non-board grains (i.e., for movements not controlled by the CWB). 
Normally, these are oats, canola, etc., but would also include any shipments of U.S. grains to or
through the Canadian grain marketing system.  Thus, allocation of railcars in Canada for shipment
of U.S. grains could affect the viability of trade flows to the extent that there are differences
between CWB and non-CWB grains.  This is in contrast to U.S. railroads which do not
distinguish country of origin in allocation of cars,  i.e., Canadian shippers have equal access to
U.S. railcars through tariff and contractual allocation mechanisms.
Regulated Rail Rates on Grain: Changes in the WGTA increased rail shipping costs paid
directly by shippers (previously, the total cost was similar, but a portion was paid directly by the
government of Canada to the railroads).  It is important that the new higher rail rates (specifically,
that portion paid by the shipper) are still substantially less than comparable rates in the United
States.  However, the legislation (Canada Transportation Act, Division VI Transportation of
Western Grain) states specifically that these rates are for the movements of  “any grain or crop
included in Schedule II that is grown in the Western Division... (p. 70) for movements to Thunder
Bay or Armstrong... and specifically excludes shipment to British Columbia ports for shipment to
the United States.”  Thus, any U.S. grain moving to/through Canada would not necessarily have
access to these rates.
The underlying legislation provides the formula for rate determination and describes its
application.  Specifically, it establishes a maximum rate scale.  These rates are frozen to the year
1999 at which time they become subject to the CTA,  unless challenged otherwise.
14  The
important point is this is a much different regulatory regime than what exists in the United States,
and it clearly only applies to grains grown in Western Canada.  
Structural Changes in Canadian Grain Handling and Processing:  During the past
decade, there have been radical changes in the structure of the Canadian grain marketing system. 
While the dynamics of these changes seem extreme, it is important that it is likely a result of the
cumulative impacts of numerous pressures.  
Grain Handling:  Before the early 1990s, the Canadian grain handling industry was largely
dominated by Canadian pools and a few Canadian private firms.  The only major U.S. firm with
Canadian handling assets was Cargill which had been in Canada for many years.  Numerous
pressures have emerged for structural changes including, but not limited to, changes in the rail
rate regime and the emergence of a North American marketplace for procurement.
As a result of these and the ensuing competitive dynamics, there have been numerous
changes.  Each of the Canadian firms and pools is in the process of rationalizing its own systems,15 An important movement is for barley to be shipped from Saskatchewan to Alberta, and periodically
other feeds are shipped from the United States.
16 Wilson and Johnson 1995b provide a description of the globalization of the malt industry, and Wilson
describes similar changes in flour. 
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resulting in fewer larger-scale country elevators.  It is notable that in many cases, these new
facilities have the ability to condition grains at the origin similar to that traditionally being done
exclusively at export terminals.  In addition, two major U.S. firms have entered the industry. 
ConAgra has entered with new construction of country elevators throughout the prairies, and
ADM created a strategic alliance with UGG with options for procurement.  The cumulative effect
of these changes will likely create an environment with excess handling capacity, greater
efficiency, lower marginal costs, and more intense competition for origination.  
Structural Changes in Canadian Processing:  In addition to these changes, there have
been notable structural changes in the Canadian grain processing sector.  First, due to growth in
the Alberta feeding industry, that province has gone from being a large feed surplus region to
potentially and periodically a feed deficit region.
15  In addition, ConAgra has announced a
proposed bio-fuel additive plant to be located in Alberta.
The second important change is that several of the major grain processing firms have been
acquired by U.S. firms.  This includes the acquisition of Canada Malt (the largest malting
company in Canada which also owns malt plants in the United States and elsewhere) by ConAgra. 
In addition, several other Canadian malt plants have taken various forms of U.S. firm ownership.
16 
Similar changes have occurred in the Canadian flour sector where ADM (through acquisitions of
Canadian-owned plants and, subsequently, a major acquisition of plants owned by a joint venture
between MapleLeaf Foods and ConAgra) has established the domineering position.  
Changes in Cross-border and Export Infrastructure: There have also been changes
which may or will directly make cross-border shipping more efficient and attractive.  One of these
has been the establishment of handling facilities located at U.S. border points with rail access. 
These include the joint ventures between Alberta Pool and General Mills at Sweetgrass and the
venture between Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and General Mills at Northgate.  While some have
initially promoted these as being primarily for shipment from Canada to the United States, their
strategic development has been to develop and facilitate trade in both directions, varying by
commodity and depending on market conditions over time.  These are likely natural logistical
channels for shipping U.S. feed grains into western Canada and potentially for shipping U.S.
grains through Canada to offshore export.
A second change that has potential long-term implications is an announced expansion of
export-handling capacity at Roberts Bank in southern British Columbia.  This is notable because
west coast handling capacity in southern Canada has been constrained which, in fact, is likely an
important cause for the escalation of movements of Canadian grain to/through the United States. 17 In trade discussions reported in January 1998, the United States suggested a pilot project to allow U.S.
grain to be shipped directly to Canadian elevators.  This is obviously an effort toward effectuating the possibility of
reciprocal trade (Western Producer).  Another step in that direction occurred on January  26, 1998 when the
Canadian Grain Commission identified facilities in the Southern prairies that would be eligible to receive grain
from U.S. producers (Agriweek). 
18 Johnson and Wilson demonstrate the impact of EEP on trade flows in the North American market. 
Most important is that EEP has the effect of increasing Canadian prices by 7¢/bu.(U.S.) and flows from Canada to
the United States by 870,000 mt.
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This constraint has also generally limited the ability of U.S. grains moving to/through Canada.  In
the future, this expansion could provide the needed capacity relief necessary to expand Canadian
west coast exports.
5. Reciprocal Access: Principal Issues
One of the visions of the Joint Commission was that ultimately, pressures will escalate for 
greater integration between the marketing systems in Canada and the United States.  The
commercial process toward integration of these systems has escalated, which, in the future, will
add to pressures to harmonize as much as possible marketing, and possibly policy, mechanisms. 
For these reasons, the term reciprocal access has been promoted as a concept for
discussion about changes to reduce trade frictions.  This term was conceived during the Joint
Commission process and ultimately held as an ideal longer-term goal.
17  Reciprocal access is an
acknowledgment that each country’s marketing and policy mechanisms have certain positive
virtues and, in a more integrated environment, should be accessible to growers on each side of the
border.  Notwithstanding the trade barriers, reciprocal access should be viewed as a longer-term
goal.  The concept can be addressed from two different scopes.  One is from the perspective of
broader policy mechanisms in which growers would have reciprocal access.  The other is that
growers would have reciprocal access to certain features of each country’s marketing mechanisms
and infrastructure.
5.1 Reciprocal Access to Agricultural (Broader) Policy Mechanisms
Farm policy mechanisms on each side of the border have effects on either price
differentials and/or trade flows.  Of particular importance and interest in the United States, these
include the of EEP (supporting U.S. prices relative to Canadian and off-shore)
18 and CRP19 Johnson and Wilson indicated that the CRP in barley has the effect of increasing Canadian barley prices
and exports to the United States.
20 Wilson, Johnson, and Dahl indicated that the value of these was about 10 cents/bu during 1994/95.
21 In addition, access to the protected barley market (particularly malting barley and malt) would have
been an advantage.  Trade restrictions in this sector  allowed premiums to accrue for malting barley within
Canada, but restricted access to this market for U.S. growers.  The effect of this has likely diminished with the
elimination of TRQs on barley and barley products.
22 Kraft et al. demonstrate that the CWB is capable of capturing premiums relative to a system with
multiple sellers.
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(resulting in reduced production in the United States and therefore supporting prices).
19  In
Canada, these would include the initial payment guarantees
20 and the pooling system.
21
5.2 Reciprocal Access to Marketing System Mechanisms
Some important competitive functions of the marketing system in each country are denied
cross-border participants in some cases.  In a marketplace with greater reciprocal access, cross-
border trade may occur due to these differences.  
In Canada, these include CWB marketing mechanisms to capture premiums,
22 lower rail
rates, and preferred car allocations.  These marketing functions are limited to operate solely for
grains produced in western Canada.  In contrast, when and as Canadian grain is exported to/
through the United States, it has full non-discriminatory access to comparable U.S. functions. 
The U.S. handling and shipping system generally has adequate capacity and is efficient enough to
induce cross-border shipments.  These are purely commercial and non-discriminatory with respect
to country of origin.
Reciprocal access involves having access to each country’s marketing system (and policy
infrastructure).  Potential benefits of the U.S. marketing system includes access to transport
infrastructure (rail, road infrastructure, barges and port infrastructure), elevators, and risk transfer
through U.S. futures markets.  While these are primarily a result of commercial relationships and
mechanisms, in a number of dimensions, the public sector is involved through providing
infrastructure, services, and a regulatory framework.   
There is minimal movement of U.S. grains to/through Canada; however, in the future
(with expansion of west coast ports and more direct cross-border and bilateral linkages),  the
likelihood/frequency of U.S. grains moving to/through Canadian infrastructure will increase.  At
that time, issues related to these barriers and differences will escalate. 13
5.3 Summary and Pressures for Change
Numerous pressures have evolved to integrate the grain marketing systems in North
America.  Most important among these include differences in relative supply and demand for
specific grain qualities and the demand for alternative logistical channels given changes in world
grain trade.  In addition, differences in farm and export policy mechanisms have in some cases
induced trade distortions and hampered an easy transition to a more fully harmonized system.  
Commercially, the grains sector of North America is becoming harmonized more rapidly
than is the policy environment.  The commercial integration will likely be a two-stage process.
First, firms will become more integrated through asset ownership etc.  As this is being done, the
next stage will be pressures to standardize commercial practices across the geographic region. 
This is the stage that is yet to evolve.  It is interesting that the commercial integration is leading,
even though it would likely be more ideal if the policy environment was harmonized first.  The
fact that the commercial sector is leading the way toward integration suggests that eventually it
will provide added pressure to harmonize the policy differences. 
As these systems become more integrated there are lessons for each country.  For the
United States, it is important that farm and export policy mechanisms that are initiated unilaterally
are antiquated and counter productive within a freer North American marketing system.  Notable
among these are the CRP and EEP programs which were each conceived in an era prior to freer
trade within North America.  In addition, commercially it is important that a portion of the trade
that has been induced has been in response to quality shortages and particularly the effects of
vomitoxin in the Northern Plains.
A number of issues continue to be important to Canada and will evolve as these systems
integrate.  The CWB will continue to be the focal point, both within Canada and from the United
States.  Pressure from the latter will persist so long as the CWB is perceived to have some
instilled advantages due to its statutory nature, relative to non-statutory rivals.  In addition to this
pressure which is not new, two others will likely become important.  One is that pressure will
eventually emerge on the transaction costs associated with CWB marketings.  New entrants into
the Canadian grain marketing system were induced partly due to the opportunities associated with
rapid structural changes in the industry and to rival the potential market power of incumbents. 
However, no doubt, once the initial structural dynamics are determined, one of the objectives that
will emerge by these new rivals will be to exploit vertical efficiencies, in part due to intra-firm
transactions.  In the process, if intra-firm transaction costs are less than those of conventional
procurement practices, then purchasing through the CWB system will be challenged.      
The second pressure will emerge in response to the apparent discriminatory nature or
some of the policies governing grain marketing in Canada which gives domestically produced
grains an advantage in movements through Canada relative to those produced in the United
States.  Reciprocal access is already an important issue confronting the future North American
grain marketing system.  Recognizing that each country’s marketing and policy mechanisms have14
certain positive virtues is important, and the major issue is the extent that these should be
accessible to growers on each side of the border.  There are important differences in the
marketing mechanisms (functions) and commercial environments determine their bilateral
accessibility.  In general, in the United States, these functions are performed non-discriminatorily
with respect to country of origin.  In contrast, in Canada, there are several very important
functions (notably those related to shipping and handling) that would treat U.S. grains differently
from Canadian grains.15
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Appendix Tables and Figures
Appendix Table 1.  Canadian NAFTA Tariffs on Grains and Selected Products - 1996.





1005.10.10 Corn - Seed, Yellow Dent C$0.394/MT
1005.10.90 Corn - Seed, Other C$0.630MT
1005.90.10 Corn - Other, Yellow Dent C$0.394/MT
1005.90.90 Corn - Other, Other C$0.630/MT
1006.1 Rice - In Husk Free
1006.2 Rice - Husked Free
1006.3 Rice - Semi/Wholly Milled C$1.102/MT
1006.4 Rice - Broken Free
1101 Wheat Flour C$1.124/MT
Source: USDA-FAS Grain and Feed Annual Attache Report - Canada 1996.




Wheat Products* 123,557 123,557
Barley Products* 11,478 19,131
* Grain Equivalent.
Source: USDA-FAS.19
Appendix Table 3.  Canada WTO Tariffs for Major Grains (Effective August 1, 1995).





-1001.10.10 W/in access commit. 4.41C$/MT 1.90C$/MT 1995/2000
-1001.10.20 Over access commit. 57.7% 49.0% 1995/2000
1001.90 Other Wheat
-1001.90.10 W/in access commit. 4.41C$/MT 1.90C$/MT 1995/2000
-1001.90.20 Over access commit. 90.0% 76.5% 1995/2000
1002 Rye Free Free 1995
1003 Barley
      For Malting
-1003.00.11 W/in access commit. 2.30C$/MT 0.99C$/MT 1995/2000
-1003.00.12 Over access commit. 111.4% 94.7% 1995/2000
     Other Barley
-1003.00.91 W/in access commit.  2.30C$/MT 0.99C$/MT 1995/2000
-1003.00.92 Over access commit. 25.1% 21.3% 1995/2000
1004 Oats
-1004.00.10 W/in access commit. Free Free 1995
-1004.00.20 Over access commit. 18.12C$/MT Free 1995
1005 Corn 
     Seed
-1005.10.10 Yellow Dent Corn 1.97C$/MT 1.26C$/MT 1995/2000
-1005.10.90 Other 3.15C$/MT 2.02C$/MT 1995/2000
     Other Corn
-1005.90.10 Yellow Dent Corn 1.97C$/MT 1.26C$/MT 1995/2000
-1005.90.90 Other 3.15C$/MT 2.02C$/MT 1995/200020
Appendix Table 3. (cont.)




-1006.10.00 In Husk  Free Free 1995
-1006.20.00 Husked       Free Free 1995
-1006.30.00 Semi-milled, etc. 5.51C$/MT 3.53C$/MT 1995/2000
-1006.40.00 Broken 5.51C$/MT 3.53C$/MT 1995/2000
1101 Wheat or Meslin Flour
-1101.00.10 W/in access commit. 5.62C$/MT 2.42C$/MT 1995/2000
-1101.00.20 Over access commit. 164.50C$/MT 139.83C$/MT 1995/2000
1107 Malt
     Not Roasted, Whole
-1107.10.11 W/In access commit. 7.30C$/MT 3.10C$/MT 1995/2000
-1107.10.12 Over access commit. 184.70C$/MT 157.00C$/MT 1995/2000
     Not Roasted, Other
1107.10.91 W/in access commit. 11.00C$/MT 4.70C$/MT 1995/2000
1107.10.92 Over access commit. 188.40C$/MT 160.10C$/MT 1995/2000
     Roasted, Whole
1107.20.11 W/in access commit. 7.3 3.1 1995/2000
1107.20.12 Over access commit. 166.5 141.5 1995/2000
     Roasted, Other
1107.20.91 W/in access commit. 11 Free 1995/2000
1107.20.92 Over access commit. 184.7 Free 1995/2000
     Wheat Starch
1108.11.10 W/in access commit. 22 9.5 1995/2000
1108.11.20 Over access commit. 276 237.9 1995/200021
Appendix Table 3. (cont.)
HS Code/Description Base Rate of Duty Bound Rate of Duty
Implement
Period
1109     Wheat Gluten
-1109.00.10 W/in access commit.  17.5% 7.5% 1995/2000
-1109.00.20 Over access commit. 467.4 397.3 1995/200022
















Figure 1.  Canadian Exports to the United States, 1990-1996.











Figure 2.  Canadian Barley Exports to the United States, by Type, 1990-1996.23













Figure 3.  U.S. Wheat Exports to and Imports From Canada, 1990-1996.24











Figure 4.  U.S. Barley Exports to and Imports From Canada, 1990-1996.25















Figure 5.  U.S. Oats Exports to and Imports From Canada, 1990-1996.











Figure 6.  U.S. Malt Exports to and Imports From Canada, 1990-1995.26













Figure 7.  Canadian Exports and Imports of Gluten to the United States, 1991-1995.












Figure 8.  Canadian Exports and Imports of Starch - Food Use to the United States, 
1991-1995.27











Figure 9.  Canadian Exports and Imports of Starch - Industrial Use to the United States,
1991-1995.











Figure 10.  Canadian Exports and Imports of Starch - Industrial Use to the United States,
1991-1995.